Pages 1 - 45 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Before The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Judge AMERICAN AIRLINES FLOW-THRU PILOTS COALITION, ET AL., Plaintiffs, VS. NO. CV 15-03125-RS ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION, ET AL., Defendants. San Francisco, California Thursday, June 21, 2018 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs: KATZENBACH LAW OFFICES 912 Lootens Place - 2nd Floor San Rafael, CA 94901 BY: CHRISTOPHER W. KATZENBACH, ESQUIRE For Defendants: JAMES & HOFFMAN, P.C. 1130 Connecticut Avenue, NW - Suite 950 Washington, DC 20036 BY: DANIEL M. ROSENTHAL, ESQUIRE ALTSHULER BERZON LLP 177 Post Street - Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 BY: JEFFREY B. DEMAIN, ESQUIRE Reported By: Pamela A. Batalo, CSR No. 3593, RMR, FCRR

Official Reporter

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THE CLERK: Calling case C 15-3125, American Airlines. vs. Allied Pilots Association.

Counsel, please come forward and state your appearances.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Hello. My name is Daniel Rosenthal from James and Hoffman. I represent the Allied Pilots Association. Jeff Demain from Altshuler Berzon is also representing APA.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. KATZENBACH: Chris Katzenbach representing plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Katzenbach.

So this matter is on for what we have styled an early Motion in Limine. I said that could be the way we proceed before, and so you've taken me up on that.

We also have a Case Management Conference, and we'll deal with that when we conclude the discussion.

I've thought about this, took a look at it, and let me give you my, again, tentative views on this.

I'm inclined to deny the motion, and the reason for that is I think evidence as to a period before the union represented the Eagle pilots, while it's not a basis for actionable conduct, to take the position now that it's inadmissible and

irrelevant is a tall order as a preliminary determination until the evidence is presented.

And by that I mean I could certainly see a scenario in which -- I'm not suggesting this is what the evidence would show -- but if the evidence was to demonstrate the buildup of a level of animus towards the Eagle pilots, that once they were represented in the period that's going to be actionable or have the actionable issues, the Letter G 2015 and going forward issues, I could certainly see a scenario in which some of that evidence might be admissible, depending on the particular reason it's being offered and the like.

To grant the Motion in Limine would be to effectively just cut off any kind of prior information on the theory that, well, during those years, there was almost a duty on the part of the union to take an adverse position with respect to those that they did not represent because they represented others whose interests might be contrary.

And so while it may be that I'm not going to let a lot of that evidence come in and I might conclude that as I hear it, it's not relevant and it's not offered for an admissible purpose, to grant the motion now, I think, is not as easy -- I understood that when you suggested we have this -- and I'm perfectly happy to have you do this and it's a legitimate run at it -- the notion was that well, there was going to be a nice, clean, obvious line that was going to be easy to call and

would streamline the case, and so I'm always interested in streamlining the case, but I just -- I don't see how I can do that at this stage of the game.

So that being my tentative, let me start with you, Mr. Rosenthal.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Thank you. And thanks for giving your tentative reaction. I will try to tailor my comments to that.

We think that it is appropriate to be resolved now and that it really should be resolved now for a couple of reasons. Let me mention those and then get into kind of the merits of the motion.

So, first of all, what's at issue here is going to have a really momentous effect, we think, on the preparation that the parties do for the trial and what the trial ends up looking like because the evidence in question here goes back to 1997, it involves five arbitration proceedings, complicated proceedings with complicated factual background evidence presented, which we believe the plaintiffs are essentially trying to re-litigate, call into question the conclusions reached in those arbitrations.

And a long history that if we go into trial not knowing whether it's going to be admissible, our side certainly and probably the plaintiffs' counsel, are going to have to do a massive amount of preparation on what that's going to look like to present that to the jury.

So for reasons of efficiency on that end, we do think it makes sense to tackle the issue now.

THE COURT: Well, but can you honestly say that there's no reasonable scenario in which evidence that is predating the 2015 operative date for the Letter G claims -- that none of that would be admissible? There is no scenario in which that would come into evidence?

MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, our argument is a little narrower than that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSENTHAL: What we're saying is we are not drawing a line at 2015 -- or actually we're not drawing any strictly chronological line. What we're saying is that evidence that occurs in the context of these particular disputes that took place when APA did not represent Flow-Through pilots -- and, by the way, we think that we've teed -- we have teed up a purely legal issue which has, as I read the briefing, essentially become undisputed, which is that APA did not owe a duty of fair representation to the pilots until they actually came up to American from Eagle.

THE COURT: Well, and I think my rulings that limited this case down to claims that flow from the Letter G activity more or less has agreed with you on that; right?

MR. ROSENTHAL: I think that, as I read your decision, you said you were dismissing claims on timeliness grounds and

reserving judgment on the representational issue largely.

THE COURT: Well, okay. I think tentatively your view that prior to the actual representation of those pilots, it would -- it's a tall order to say that you owed them a duty.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Okay.

THE COURT: I mean --

MR. ROSENTHAL: Appreciate that.

THE COURT: That's a tentative view, but --

MR. ROSENTHAL: I understand.

And we think we've presented everything in the papers that would allow you to take that tentative view and turn it into a firm view.

But my point is that what we're targeting with our motion here is much more specific than a chronological cutoff. What we're saying is that these disputes, specifically these five arbitration proceedings, which is what most of this evidence relates to, where APA did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs, it did owe a duty to another group and it acted to advance the interests of its members within its bargaining unit. That's the evidence that we're trying to exclude.

So we are not -- first of all, the plaintiffs came to -- I believe most of the named plaintiffs came to American before 2015. Anything that -- and certainly many in the class did. So anything that happened to them once they were at American certainly is fair game.

But even before that, if there were evidence that kind of was not within the context of these disputes where APA had a duty, we're not asking you to exclude that at this time.

THE COURT: Well, so give me an example -- I guess, can you crystalize for me what exactly you think the in limine order ought to say? It's excluding what precisely?

MR. ROSENTHAL: So I think there are a few ways that it could be couched. What we did in our brief is we tried to give you a specific list of evidence that we were seeking to exclude. So it was evidence relating to the five arbitration proceedings chiefly, and then in addition to that, we identified certain, what we would call, stray remarks that -- so we were -- we were targeting --

THE COURT: Let's stop on the stray remarks. I mean, I understand you say they're stray remarks and they're not -they shouldn't be given much credence for purposes of
bolstering any of these claims, but if there are remarks that
demonstrate -- and let's -- and I'm not suggesting this is in
the record, but some really egregious comment about, you know,
"When I have my chance, I'm going to get these people" or, you
know, I -- something that would really show that even once
they -- even when the union is representing these individual
pilots, that they're going to be mistreated. I mean, that
would be admissible.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Yeah. So I think that if there were

evidence that any of the people involved in the Letter G negotiations certainly, maybe arguably anyone in the leadership of APA at that time, had previously in the past made comments that reflected a personal animus towards the Flow-Through pilots, we're not asking you to exclude that, no.

And if you were to hold that -- so what we are targeting are remarks that were made by line pilots, meaning pilots not in the -- involved in APA, but other American pilots --

THE COURT: How would that, though, go to the union's activities? If stray members, using the "stray" word -- if, you know, the pilot on the -- on the beat is making comments about other pilots, the Eagle pilots, why does that have any --

MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, that's precisely our question.

THE COURT: But that's a different objection. That's an objection that's not "oh, exclude this because you're" -- that's arguing well, this person isn't in a position to bind the entity or something like that. I didn't think that was what your Motion in Limine was.

Your Motion in Limine seems primarily focused on once you determine that there is no duty of representation, then effectively nothing that any of these people say leading up to the point at which they represent them has any relevance or significance, and if -- and it sounds like you're not taking that broad a view.

MR. ROSENTHAL: No, we're not.

And I think that our motion groups in together a few different types of evidence, so one is the evidence regarding the arbitration disputes. And then the remarks are -- and it may be that we would have been better served by separating those into different motions. And we certainly don't think they're necessarily tied together.

The remarks we're targeting because many of them that plaintiffs have cited in their discovery responses and in their depositions do not come from APA leadership or people involved in the union at all.

And then others come from people who were involved in APA leadership at that time, the late '90s generally, but who then were long gone from APA leadership by the time that Letter G was negotiated. So those could be two different categories.

And then I would say a third category altogether would be evidence that doesn't relate to remarks but relates to the positions taken in these arbitrations where I would say we have the strongest argument for excluding that third category, the arbitration-related -- the positions of the parties presented in arbitration where APA was acting in furtherance of its duty and where APA really had a legal duty not to take into account the interests of pilots outside its bargaining unit to the detriment of pilots within its bargaining unit, which is what the Ninth Circuit said in McNamara Blad.

So we think, in addition to just not seeing the relevance

from a, you know, standard perspective of this happened a long time ago or whatever, we think that the kind of -- the labor policy underlying the duty of fair representation compels the conclusion that a union -- it should not be held against a union in litigation for acting in furtherance of that duty, and it would send a terrible message to unions if that were the case.

And we also think that federal labor policy says when a dispute is submitted to arbitration, which is the preferred method of resolving disputes about interpretation of a contract and actually the only method under the Railway Labor Act where that can be done, with some narrow exceptions, that once that takes place, a party shouldn't be allowed to then go into court and re-litigate those arbitrations, say the positions were wrong, that decisions were mot followed if there was no arbitration proceeding initiated to -- over that.

So we think that applies with full force to the arbitration proceedings and I think you're right in the sense that those arguments do not necessarily apply so much to the remarks or at all to the remarks, negative comments, that sort of thing, which I think is in a different category and is our argument.

So they are more about the passage of time and the fact that those people were not involved in the Letter G

negotiations.

THE COURT: With respect to those issues, I think that has to be done in the course of the trial as opposed to some broad-based pretrial ruling, but okay.

Did you want to say something before I turn it over to Mr. Katzenbach?

MR. DEMAIN: Could I add one thing to what Mr. Rosenthal said?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DEMAIN: When you were talking about your tentative views at the beginning, I was trying to write them down very quickly. I hope I got them right. But I thought I heard you say that to exclude the evidence from these arbitrations that the plaintiffs want to introduce -- to exclude it at this point -- I think you said to cut it off -- would be to say that there was a duty, that APA had a duty to take a position adverse to the plaintiffs in those arbitrations.

I actually think that is, in fact, true. There was such a duty. And if you look at the Ninth Circuit case law like McNamara Blad, it makes it clear --

THE COURT: But I guess my point is even accepting
that, I'm not sure -- I don't see how pretrial at this stage -you can assume that they had a duty to take an adverse
position. There still could be evidence that went on in those

proceedings that are nonetheless admissible for another reason.

I mean, you know, if you -- it happens to be consistent with your duty to be very negative about the other side, that still may mean that there is relevance to some of the things you said about the other side, even if you were acting perfectly consistently with the duty that you had at that time.

I'm just concerned -- I mean, obviously I haven't seen all this evidence, and to take this broad-brush position without my knowing exactly what I'm excluding causes me some concern.

At trial, I'll know what it is -- I mean, you know, in the course of an arbitration proceeding, perhaps some evidence or someone says something that may be consistent with their duty to represent their clients at that time but will be relevant to their state of mind when many years later they're representing those people.

I guess the better way for me to say this is it's not mutually exclusive, in my mind, that if you are doing your duty, if you will, representing your then-clients, that doesn't necessarily mean the information isn't for another purpose, credibility or something else, not otherwise admissible.

MR. DEMAIN: Well, let me say, Your Honor, I think -on a theoretical level, I think you're completely correct about
that. The problem for this case -- I think there is two
problems for this case.

The first is, the plaintiffs haven't pointed to -- haven't

shown the Court any statements that were made in the arbitrations that are relevant to that. For example, if someone for APA said, "We think that those Eagle pilots were a bunch of bums" --

THE COURT: Drunks. They're all drunks or something like that.

MR. DEMAIN: If they had said something like that, that might be relevant, but that's not why they're trying -- they haven't pointed to anything like that and we're not aware of anything like that in those arbitration proceedings.

They're trying to introduce, for example, the briefs that APA submitted and the arbitration decisions because their purpose in introducing this is to say that the adverse position that APA took -- the position that APA took to represent its bargaining unit members was adverse to the Flow-Through pilots, to Mr. Katzenbach's clients, and because it took that -- that position, that adverse position, therefore that alone shows hostility.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. DEMAIN: And that's inadmissible for that purpose.

THE COURT: -- I think you may well be right about -- and I might view it the same way you do, that simply filing a brief that is adverse to the Flow-Through pilots and to expect that that can come into evidence to show animus and the like -- I may well agree with you on that.

My point is that -- is pretrial -- at trial I'll have the benefit of knowing exactly what Mr. Katzenbach wants to introduce and what he doesn't want to introduce. And you're -- it's a tall order for me to just cast this broad brush now and say, "Listen, if this pertains to things that went on during these arbitrations, none of that is going to be admissible because it's -- you know, they were doing their duty and end of story. It's out of bounds. We're not going to go there."

And I suppose my basic reaction is you may well, you know, lose this battle but win the war because I'm going to exclude it, and the reason you're saying, "Well, you should do it now is it will streamline our case," and I'm very -- that's a very appealing concept to me, but I am just -- I am uncomfortable with the idea that until I have more specific materials in front of me, i.e., the exhibit list and we can see what they want to introduce and they have to make an offer of why they want it to come in, I'm a little -- I'm reticent to do that.

MR. DEMAIN: Okay. Well, Your Honor the only thing I guess I can say then is that I think that if he had some evidence that went beyond the positions that APA was taking, it was incumbent upon them to present that now and say, "Look, Your Honor, we're not just using it to try and show that APA's position was adverse. There were these other things that they said in here that show hostility that have nothing to do with the mere fact that they were taking an adverse position." But

they haven't done that.

And also they said in their opposition briefs they want to show that APA then violated arbitrator's orders and that there was an arbitration decision that wasn't really a decision because it was a corrupt settlement, that the arbitrator conspired with the parties to call an arbitration decision. This is pretty way-out stuff, and they haven't come to you and given you a legitimate reason to introduce this.

We made a motion saying here's why they want to use it. They didn't contradict anything that we said. They sort of doubled down on it and said, "Yeah, and we want to show that you violated arbitration awards," which they can't do because there is no federal jurisdiction over that. "We want to show there was this corrupt bargain with the arbitrator to" -- I mean, this is stuff that is going to make the trial into a circus.

even if you were to prevail on this motion, I'm not sure -- the order would sort of beg the question. The order would say well, to the extent that the evidence is only being introduced to recount the fact that there were arbitration proceedings in prior years when the Flow-Through pilots were not represented by these unions, by the union defendants, well, that's not going to be admissible. But we reserve the right or leave open the question if there -- if it's being offered for some other

purpose.

Well, it's not going to advance the ball any because then we will get some collection of exhibits being designated, and you'll say, "Well, all they're doing is they're doing this for that specific reason," and maybe I'll agree with you, or Mr. Katzenbach will say, "No, no, no, I'm offering this for a different focus and it's to go to the credibility of this witness" or what have you. I'm not sure this is going to streamline anything, is the point.

MR. DEMAIN: Your Honor, I can tell you it would streamline it to this extent. It would at least give the parties some guidance about what the standards are going to be so that Mr. Katzenbach can look at his exhibit list and say, "Okay, well if I can't get stuff in just because it shows their adverse position, let me whittle this down and find a few things that go beyond that that maybe I have a shot at getting in," and then we can come back and say, "Well, okay, this, this, and this can come in. We agree it goes beyond that. But this, this, and this don't," and we can have that fight later, but at least to give the parties some kind of guidance, I think.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEMAIN: And also, again, these stray remarks that had nothing to do with these were line pilots and this was stuff from the 1990s. I can't even think of a scenario in

which those should come in.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Katzenbach.

MR. KATZENBACH: Well, Your Honor, I think that the problem here is -- in responding to this is I'm not really sure what they want to exclude and the reasons for their reason to exclude it. I'm not really sure -- I think that one of the problems here is -- well, let me back it up and make a suggestion here.

The way they've presented the motion I think that it really -- they're sort of in this area where you can't look at it -- they want to exclude background evidence of motive, but what -- and what we're trying to show -- and undoubtedly we're going to try to put it in evidence to try to -- motive.

They have made a argument here today which is a repeat of some of the arguments they've made before about their duty -- who do they have the duty to represent.

And the problem with that argument -- the reason I'm raising it now, Your Honor, is because I think this will actually come up later on and maybe it's an issue the parties should brief again more to you because this is the real problem that I have with some of this.

It's clear that when they were favoring the TWA Staplees, they were not part of the same bargaining unit; in other words, they weren't under the contract so they represented them in the same way that, for example, the Airline Pilots Association

represents multiple carriers, employees.

But you can't favor the carrier -- ALPA can't favor the carriers at, you know, Simons Air or Envoy Air. What they are saying is we can favor the TWA Staplees at TWA-LLC because they're wholly-owned by American Airlines, but we can discriminate against the Eagle pilots, who are also a company wholly-owned by American Airlines, even though the TWA-LLC pilots aren't in the same bargaining unit. And we know that because if they were in the same bargaining unit, the contract would have automatically flowed over to them and they wouldn't even be negotiating for these benefits for them.

So there are some complicated issues here that I feel haven't been as well --

THE COURT: Complicated in the sense of who they represent at any one time?

MR. KATZENBACH: Well, more importantly, were they -were the TWA-LLC pilots in the same bargaining unit as the -the American Airlines pilots. The answer is no.

So, you know, when you talk about representational duties, what they're really saying is because we represent two distinct groups of people with two distinct employers, that therefore we owe a duty to the TWA pilots as against the Flow-Through pilots. Well, that's not really -- but in the -- in the relationship with American Airlines.

And so what they're doing is they're saying because we

represent American Airline pilots --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KATZENBACH: -- right -- we can now treat TWA-LLC pilots as if they are American Airline pilots, even though technically they're not.

So what we have pointed out -- and this -- and this distinction not only arises early on, but it manifests itself throughout periods of time when Flow-Through pilots are on board at American, and, I mean, the best -- the -- the Letter G negotiations are one example, but as a sort of side example of that, take the equity distribution case.

Now, I don't -- the details of that aren't important. The three facts that are important are that they moved the qualification date to a date so that the last TWA Pilot gets onto the American Airline property and the first Flow-Through Pilot, who has been pushed back because of this earlier arbitration, we think fake arbitration order, can't. So Flow-Through pilots cut off. TWA pilots cut on -- allowed, you know -- they move the date to fit them, and in their own decision, they write, "And by the way, we also made some other good-faith equity adjustments for the TWA-LLC pilots."

Well, I don't think it's going to take really a long time to discuss that. What we're really saying is that when you consistently favor one group over another, there becomes a time when it looks like that you're doing that deliberately. When

you don't --

THE COURT: Yes. Although their point -- and I understand there may be more subtleties to it as you've just described in terms of who is representing whom at what time, but if you simply operate on the basic premise that if -- let's assume for purposes of discussion a clean break between entities that are represented by the union and entities that are not.

They're right that if -- if they are taking positions on behalf of the members they represent and it's plain that another group of pilots they do not represent -- if you just had a very simple scenario like that, then you would say -- you would have to say -- at the very least, treat with a great deal of skepticism that the positions they took in those arbitration proceedings shouldn't be admissible to show that they are motivated to harm at a later stage when they do represent them, the new members.

I mean, if you had -- and I know you're suggesting to me well, it's not that simple here. So that's fine. That's a different sort of point. But do you agree that if we simply -- let's say we had, you know -- when United merges with Continental and you have a union before representing each of those airlines separately, their pilots, and then at a certain point in time, the entities merge and the argument is well, the union is now -- even though they represent the Continental

pilots are still favoring the United pilots, and we're going to prove that by going five years ago and showing an arbitration proceeding where they were, something like that. You would agree that that wouldn't be admissible.

MR. KATZENBACH: Probably not. But -- I wish I could say that the -- that the history here was -- is not as discrete as that and that's -- I mean, every year, for example, the -- well, since they had the last contract was 11 years. Before the '13 contract.

When they renegotiate contracts, what they have do is they have a scope clause in there which is expressly designed to limit the amount of flying that Eagle pilots can do. So there is this ongoing issue of, you know, wanting to keep Eagle pilots from having work and giving the work to APA-represented pilots.

So while I understand the idea of remoteness and separateness, there is this consistent thread throughout this of looking -- of trying to keep the Eagle pilots from being American pilots in a variety of different contexts.

And in the example that you were giving -- I mean, to make it concrete to this case, if they wanted to negotiate with TWA-LLC, the TWA-LLC pilots could flow down to Eagle; right? Fine. They'd have a real problem doing that because they -- you know, because the people flowing -- because then they would have a problem of trying to deal with the Eagle pilots and

their Eagle representations because you can't just have

American agree for one -- to add a new group of people to the

Flow-Through Agreement without getting the agreement of the

Eagle pilots. But if they wanted to do that, that would be

within their representational structure.

But what they can't do is say even though we're going to represent these other people and we're going to give them rights that they don't have at the expense of the Eagle pilots' rights and even in the face of an agreement which -- where we're going to now call them furloughed pilots when they haven't met the one criteria that everyone acknowledges that you have to get in an American Airline plane with American Airline livery and take off before you are an American Airline Pilot and that these guys didn't do that one thing, just like my guys who were called back didn't do that one thing.

I think it's a legitimate issue to say why are you favoring one guy -- when they are exactly the same situation and you're saying we're going to give the benefits here and we are going to hurt you there, I think it's a legitimate inference that they are doing it for -- for -- out of hostile motivations, and we have a background to show that.

So I agree --

THE COURT: Do you agree that you can't -- if someone who is not in the management of the -- of the union, just a member of the union, i.e., some American pilots, say nasty

things about American Eagle pilots and how they're not up to snuff and "they shouldn't be included within our ranks" and all of that sort of thing, those are stray remarks. And they are not -- they don't -- they don't bind the management of the union, they don't reflect the positions that the union takes.

MR. KATZENBACH: Well, I do think -- you know, as much as I would like to sit and agree with you, the -- I think that it may depend on other factors; namely, how persuasive is it because, look, these are elected positions so that, you know, it's not -- it is not like an employer, right, where, you know, the employees -- where the employees don't elect their managers. So that, you know, a stray remark by an employee just has no real bearing on -- even logically bearing on what the employer may decide. That's not entirely true, but less so.

But here we're talking politics and -- and, you know, one of the factors on whether -- hopefully this will be done easily and quickly. So -- the example here is you have a group, for example, Pilots Protecting the Profession, I believe, they were called, who are adamant that Eagle pilots should not have regional jets. Some of those members -- some of those people ultimately get elected into positions at APA and, in fact, are there at some times at some of these events, the leadership there. So what does -- so, I mean --

THE COURT: Well, it's a different proposition, at

least a different argument, if you are identifying somebody who is in at the relevant time the management -- had been elected to a management position within the union and in earlier days before that person was in management and they were a rank-and-file pilot, they made various comments, well, that's a different proposition. I'm not suggesting that would necessarily be excluded.

But if you have somebody who has never had any involvement in union management, elected or otherwise, and just makes comments because they are a member of the union and they don't like Eagle pilots, I mean, so what?

MR. KATZENBACH: I think we would have to show some form of ALPA involvement in that comment. I mean, for example, not -- this is off the top.

For example, if, you know, Bob Jones was handing out a leaflet and Bob Jones is just a representative, right, it would make a difference whether that leaflet was printed by ALPA and given to him by his representative.

So I appreciate -- those are issues we intend to address, and I think those are going to be issues that the Court is unfortunately going to have to address at length in the pretrial and that will be I think an appropriate time to do it, unless, of course, the Court never wants to address it, in which case --

THE COURT: Well, okay. Let me go back to

Mr. Rosenthal and --

MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ROSENTHAL: I have a few comments.

So I actually think that the example you will gave with United and Continental is exactly right and exactly on point to what we're saying about the arbitration proceedings. And what Mr. Katzenbach -- I think what Mr. Katzenbach was saying is it's more complicated than that because APA represented the TWA pilots, but they were in a different bargaining unit. That's just not right.

If you look at the orders of the NMB, the National Mediation Board, which regulates air and rail unions, they are cited in footnote 1 of our brief. The NMB found that American and TWA-LLC were a single unit, single air carrier, and that APA represented them within its bargaining unit of American Airlines pilots. And there is really no comparison whatsoever to Eagle.

Eagle was owned by American, but it had its own exclusive representative and there was, of course, no NMB order ever saying -- during this period that APA represented those pilots and there are bright lines here, I think, as there have to be so unions know who is in their unit and who's not.

So I do think it really is that simple to say that during these five arbitration proceedings, APA took positions that

advantaged members in its unit and that, as you said, that doesn't show that APA was trying to harm anyone else. It was simply fulfilling its duty. And that its -- so I would -- I would say even if you want --

THE COURT: Of course that all, for whatever reason -there is -- that some of that comes into evidence, that's -that's your cross-examination. I mean, that's your argument to
say well, they had a duty to do this. And that's what you tell
the jury. So, I mean, to some extent, you have a response to
that.

MR. ROSENTHAL: We do, but --

THE COURT: And I understand that your position is not, "Oh, we would be horribly and unfairly prejudiced." Your particular spiel here, which is one that sings to the judge, is, "We really want to make a four-week trial a two-week trial," and I understand that.

MR. ROSENTHAL: It's actually both, I think, because I think we are worried that a jury of lay people who don't necessarily fully understand kind of a duty of fair representation, they're not lawyers and they don't necessarily understand those bright lines of when a union represent -- has a legal duty to who. I do think there is a real risk of prejudice there that they may be --

THE COURT: Of course, though, you presumably would ask for an instruction or something that would tell the jury

that there is an obligation on the part of the union to represent its members and some -- I mean --

MR. ROSENTHAL: Hopefully. We would certainly welcome that. And it really is both the length and the prejudice.

In terms of equity distribution proceeding, which

Mr. Katzenbach raised, I don't need to get too far into that,

but that's not covered by our motion because that's something

that happened after these pilots were at --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSENTHAL: -- APA. So we're not even trying to exclude that at that time. We do have some other issues with that, which we reserve the right to seek to exclude it later.

And then finally on the remarks, we did have an opportunity to depose the plaintiffs and go through, in a pretty fine-grained way, what the remarks were that they were trying to introduce, who said them, whether they were APA leadership, and most of them are not from APA leadership or any involvement of APA and we do think that it would be helpful for the Court to issue an order that says that that's not admissible.

MR. DEMAIN: Your Honor, could I add one thing?

THE COURT: You are double teaming me. Go ahead.

MR. DEMAIN: Thank you. I appreciate it.

Well, Mr. Katzenbach is very formidable. It takes two of us --

THE COURT: There you go, Mr. Katzenbach.

Go ahead.

MR. KATZENBACH: I surrender.

MR. DEMAIN: The only other thing that Mr. Katzenbach brought up that I think I need to address, he brought up

American and APA agreeing to allow the TWA pilots to flow down without getting the agreement of the Eagle pilots to do that.

Again, that is a cut-and-dried representational situation. The APA represented both -- as Mr. Katzenbach has admitted and we cited his admissions, he has admitted that APA represented both the American pilots and the TWA pilots. They didn't have to consult with the Eagle pilots because the Eagle pilots were adverse to them.

When they did that, when they negotiated that agreement and the TWA pilots flowed down, ALPA, the Airline Pilots Association, which was the representative of the Eagle pilots brought agreements, and it went to arbitration, which is one of the five arbitrations we're talking about.

They said, "They violated the Flow-Through Agreement by doing this." The arbitrator held that it did not violate the Flow-Through Agreement. It was within the rights of American and APA to reach that agreement to let the -- the TWA pilots flow down, and, again, this is exactly what Mr. Katzenbach is trying to do. He is trying to introduce that and he's trying to re-litigate-litigate that arbitration decision by saying --

THE COURT: But --1 MR. DEMAIN: -- by saying it did violate --2 THE COURT: -- I guess going back to my concern -- and 3 we'll fight it out at the trial, but -- is -- unless you're 4 saying -- and maybe I should ask Mr. Katzenbach this. 5 If the only reason for introducing the arbitration 6 7 proceedings is to say they occurred and who took what position 8 in that arbitration, that would be one thing. If there were things said or positions taken during the 9 arbitration that have some relevance to -- in some other aspect 10 11 of what went on beyond just the positions taken by the parties, I don't know that yet. I mean, I just don't know. 12 13 I understand what you're saying. If it's being introduced 14 solely for the purpose of saying that the defendants were --15 took a hostile position to the plaintiffs and your answer to that is --16 17 MR. DEMAIN: Of course we did. THE COURT: -- "of course we did. We were 18 19 representing our members." 20 MR. DEMAIN: Right. 21 **THE COURT:** If that's -- if that's the only reason 22 it's being introduced, that at a point prior to the operative 23 time here, you were adverse to them, I agree with you. That in and of itself is not admissible. 24 25 But you're then going one step further -- and maybe you're

not, but I hear -- I thought you were going a step further and saying, "And, in fact, because of that posture, nothing that went on during the arbitration proceedings can be otherwise admissible for any reason." And I -- and maybe there isn't anything there, but I don't know enough to say that's out of bounds. The arbitration proceeding is entirely out of bounds.

MR. DEMAIN: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Katzenbach has not told us anything yet as to what other grounds this could be admissible on, so I think it was incumbent on him to do so.

But I will say even if there were another reason for it to come in, I think under a 403 analysis, it should still be kept out because he is going to use it to prejudice the jury.

THE COURT: Perhaps so --

MR. DEMAIN: We've moved under 403.

THE COURT: Perhaps so, but I don't think -- a 403 analysis is particularly one that is very hard to do at this stage of the game before, you know, I have the witnesses and the exhibits and -- I mean, you can do a 403 analysis when it's something very straightforward like, you know, they want to -- prior criminal conviction and you know what it is and you're weighing its prejudicial value -- probative value versus prejudicial effect. Here that's kind of tough to do.

MR. DEMAIN: Except it's not tough whereas here

Mr. Katzenbach has failed to articulate any other ground on
which this --

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask him.

it.

Mr. Katzenbach, are you -- this -- the fact of an arbitration proceeding where parties took disparate positions and, in fact, took a position adverse, admittedly, to your clients, are you saying that should be just in and of itself admissible?

MR. KATZENBACH: No, not particularly.

I think that there is -- I think that our major focus is -- is slightly different than that. I think that -- and let's start with, I think, some of -- I don't really -- the outcome of an arbitration provision -- decision seems to me straightforward; right? And under, I think, the law the Court has referred to, the people -- people who now comes -- becomes -- the parties are all bound by it; correct? I mean, that's not difficult.

So if I come to you and say, "Yeah, I know we lost that arbitration," right, "but screw you, I'm just going to do something to hurt you anyway," why doesn't that show that you have some degree of hostility towards --

THE COURT: Well, do you have evidence like that?

MR. KATZENBACH: Yeah. Exactly.

THE COURT: Well, they're saying they've never seen

MR. KATZENBACH: I pled it in our Complaint, so if they haven't seen it, it's because --

THE COURT: I think they are telling me that discovery has been done and that nothing -- so they're trying to put the onus back on you to say well, okay, if it's something other than the result of the arbitration that you're looking to introduce, show your cards.

MR. KATZENBACH: Okay.

THE COURT: Where is the evidence? Just like you've described.

MR. KATZENBACH: Exactly.

The evidence is this: That before they began the major bit of hiring where my clients were basically completely frozen out, they completely took Staplees ahead of them, there was the arbitration decision that said -- I believe it was LaRocco -- that said, no, the TWA Staplees are new higher pilots and therefore the Flow-Through Agreement applies to those positions. That meant that my clients got some of those positions. We can argue whether they got all of them, some of them, or one for one.

That was the decision. That was issued in May. When they started hiring the next June, a month later, they ignored it.

They ignored it in June, July, August, and all the way up to the end.

So our position is really simple. That that is an arbitration decision, that is an outcome. Now, they want to say, "Well, but we were still representing the interests of the

TWA pilots at that point to" -- to do what? At that point it's a remedy issue. It's not an issue of what this contract means and it's not an issue of what your obligations under this contract means. It is an issue of how do these -- the particular people who brought this arbitration, you know, get compensated. It doesn't say anything about this -- this decision as to what the contract means is inapplicable. It doesn't mean bring another arbitration. It means follow this arbitration.

And when they don't follow that arbitration, I believe that is evidence of bad faith, that is evidence of hostility to my people -- well, the people I represent -- and that we can use it for that purpose.

It is not representing someone to ignore your contractual -- to ignore binding decisions. I guess that is the simplest -- you know, and if they can say that ignoring a binding decision is within the scope of our duty of representation, then, you know -- and we can't use it to show that we -- that we were doing this because we're hostile, I think that's wrong. I think that we can show it because it shows hostility to my people and we can show the background of that. We can show that we don't get these jobs because they don't like Flow-Through pilots. They don't like --

THE COURT: Wait. If Mr. Katzenbach is -- his position -- and it may not be persuasive in the end, but he's

saying that sure, you have a duty of representation for your clients, but his position is the evidence will show you went beyond what your duty was.

MR. DEMAIN: I will explain why that isn't the case, Your Honor.

He is referring to a particular arbitration. In that arbitration, the arbitrator did say that the Flow-Through Agreement applies to these Flow-Through pilots, but the arbitrator specifically said, "I am not giving you a remedy. I'm not saying who you have to hire first or second."

The parties then went forward with APA representing its -its pilots' interests. It came to a second arbitration. And
then that arbitrator said, "Okay, now I'm going to rule" -- or
maybe it was even a third arbitration. The arbitrator said,
"You have to hire so many FTPs and you can hire -- recall so
many American pilots," and APA complied with that decision.
This is exactly what I'm saying.

He's trying to re-litigate-litigate all of these arbitrations. And the play -- if you have an argument that the union has violated an arbitrator's decision, the forum for that is arbitration and that's why the parties did go back to arbitration.

A federal court has no jurisdiction to determine whether a union violated an arbitrator's award. And, again, you know, he's trying to do this --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. DEMAIN: If this stuff comes, I'm going to say it will prejudice the jury and we will move for a mistrial on that.

THE COURT: I wouldn't be making the decision you just teed up. I wouldn't be making the decision on whether or not they violated the arbitration decision or what have you because the only basis on which it would be -- the only basis on which it would conceivably be admissible is if it's demonstrating some motive and animus in how it all developed that the jury could -- could infer carries over into this -- it's not for me to -- to re-litigate-litigate arbitral decisions and say, "Oh, no, that arbitration -- that arbiter was wrong."

I don't think he's asking me to do that. He's asking me to say if you look at the positions that were taken, rightly or wrongly in terms of the arbitration decision, they took positions which reflect their bad faith and their intent to do more than just win but to harm these -- I'm not -- I'm not suggesting there's anything there. I'm just saying that that's the -- the rubric I hear he wants to seek to get this introduced.

MR. DEMAIN: The problem with that theory, Your Honor, is that you can't conclude that it showed animus going beyond what the union needed to do --

THE COURT: Isn't that what the jury would have to be

deciding?

MR. DEMAIN: In order to decide that, the jury would have to decide that, yes, it violated the arbitrator's award because if it didn't violate the arbitrator's award, then it's clear the union is just -- it went to another arbitration. The union represented its bargaining members.

THE COURT: Whether or not it violated the arbitral award is not the question. The question is, to a juror I think, does that demonstrate to me that they had developed a legal of antagonism and animus towards these other individuals that members of the other union or Eagle pilots -- that they were going to -- they were going to set out to get them later, is sort of the argument.

And so it wouldn't be -- and I understand you're saying even -- you know, "because we are doing our duty to represent our clients, that means that we're taking" -- "whatever positions we're taking, you can't ascribe that to our general attitude towards these other people." I understand that point.

But I think you're -- I think to say that the arbitration -- the fact that there's an arbitration proceeding that's ongoing sort of insulates everything that happens in that arbitration proceeding from being admitted for any purpose in -- at any other time is -- is going too far. It's almost like a 408 argument of saying well, it occurred in a settlement discussion so we -- nothing that occurs in that context can

ever be used. And that's not really what you're saying.

MR. DEMAIN: I think it's contrary to federal labor policy, Your Honor, because the union has a duty to exercise its -- to conduct itself to represent its members and to take adverse positions to other people, and if you -- if you say that, "Oh-ho, but if you do it, whatever you do in that proceeding can come in in a later proceeding and say -- show that you were prejudiced against these people," it's putting the union in an impossible position.

THE COURT: I understand the argument. I think I understand the posture we're in.

Let me -- go ahead, Mr. Katzenbach.

MR. KATZENBACH: No. I think we're just running a treadmill here.

THE COURT: I think it is. Okay. I will take that matter under submission. Take a look. I will, you know, reassess this, and I'm not exactly sure, as I sit here now, even though I had the tentatively, exactly what I'm growing going to craft. Frankly, it may not be a win or a lose proposition. It may be that there is more of a guidance concept here than -- than the order of the Court is grant or deny the motion. I will take a look at it.

Let's now shift to the CMC.

So you'll get an order from me on this matter. It may or may not be enlightening.

So where do we go from here? Discovery is concluded. 1 Go ahead. 2 MR. KATZENBACH: I would like to throw a wrench into 3 the mechanism. 4 THE COURT: Oh, why not. Go right ahead. 5 MR. KATZENBACH: And you should have before you -- at 6 least it was filed yesterday -- an administrative -- a request 7 for administrative order because we filed a new case involving 8 a new LOS issue, which is basically expanding Letter G to now 9 10 not be two years, but be full. 11 THE COURT: So what is this? This is an amendment or a new lawsuit? 12 13 MR. KATZENBACH: Because of DFR and the short time 14 limits, I get nervous just not filing -- I don't want to file a 15 supplemental -- it seemed like a supplemental Complaint, but 16 that requires a motion --17 THE COURT: Then you are seeking to relate it to this 18 case? MR. KATZENBACH: You have an administrative motion to 19 20 relate it, yes. THE COURT: All right. Well, you obviously haven't 21 22 responded to any of this yet. 23 MR. DEMAIN: We've barely seen it, Your Honor. We hadn't heard hide nor hair from Mr. Katzenbach for weeks, 24 25 despite many attempts to contact him, and then this arrives

over the transom. 1 THE COURT: Hold on a minute. 2 You do -- Mr. Katzenbach, I feel very strongly about this 3 and I think you know that. I care about --4 5 MR. KATZENBACH: I may --THE COURT: Go ahead. You're going to do a mea culpa, 6 7 so go ahead. 8 MR. KATZENBACH: I'm going to do a mea culpa. I just apologize. A case in Los Angeles is eating me alive and, you 9 know -- I mean literally, and it's been very difficult. 10 11 literally -- they have been filing two or more motions a month. THE COURT: Well, you know, going forward -- if you 12 13 were seeking to amend -- I know this is not an amend situation; 14 you are bringing a new lawsuit and I will take a look at it. 15 But in the nature of things here, you have got to have a 16 line of communication back and forth, and who knows -- you 17 might have been able to work out some arrangement to how to 18 proceed. 19 But starting now -- is that L.A. case over, I hope? 20 MR. KATZENBACH: No. It's set for trial in early part 21 of next year. THE COURT: Oh, great. Well --22 23 MR. KATZENBACH: Which is --THE COURT: You've got to meet and confer. 24 MR. KATZENBACH: I will, Your Honor. 25

THE COURT: It's absolutely required. And I don't expect you to respond to whatever this thing is because you haven't had a chance to see it.

So where do we go with this? I could start to set dates.

I'd like to. This is an old case now. But I also think you've got to figure out what this is all about.

MR. DEMAIN: Well, Your Honor, maybe if I could make a suggestion.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DEMAIN: We need to take a look at this case and determine what our position is going to be. And also we suggested setting the pretrial at a certain time after you rule on the Motion in Limine because that will inform our thinking about the case.

Maybe what --

THE COURT: You mean divorced from a trial date is the pretrial?

MR. DEMAIN: Yes.

Maybe what we should do is put over another CMC to, say, the middle of July. By that time, we will have been able to formulate a position on this new case and we can talk about where we're going with this case.

The discovery did close like six months ago.

THE COURT: No. It did. I mean, we should get moving on this and get it resolved one way or the other.

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MR. KATZENBACH: Again, that's fine with me, or we could set a trial date. I just want to make sure I don't conflict with what I have to do down in Los Angeles. THE COURT: What's this trial you've got -- not the one you're in now, but the one you said is the beginning of next year? MR. KATZENBACH: It's a -- it's a little bit of an odd procedural posture, but essentially it's an internal union dispute under Landrum-Griffin. THE COURT: How long will it take? MR. KATZENBACH: There are two disputes. They should be consolidated for trial, but I don't think they will be, but who knows. I think it's probably about a week trial or two-week trial, depending on what they are. THE COURT: Just for my edification, putting aside what this new matter is, when do you think you are going to be asking me to put this on the trial calendar? MR. KATZENBACH: April, May. THE COURT: April, May. This case? April or May of next year? MR. DEMAIN: MR. KATZENBACH: Yes. MR. DEMAIN: That's a long time. THE COURT: It is a long time. MR. KATZENBACH: The alternative would be September

and that seems to be a little short time.

MR. DEMAIN: I don't know that September would be short if the Motion in Limine were granted because then this would be a short trial. However, if the Motion in Limine, as I understand, probably won't be granted, this could be a two- to three-month trial because we're going to go very deeply into those arbitrations.

THE COURT: I'm not willing to accept those as the only two options. I think, even if your motion would be not granted at all, I'll give each side a block of hours, and I'm not going to give you -- a case like this is going to get maybe 15 hours per side or something. Don't hold me to that. You're not going to get a two months to try this case.

But that all said, I have to say that I -- my calendar is such that September is probably not realistic. So we are talking about later in the year or next year, and so we'll see.

But I do want to get it -- I want to get it resolved. It is one of my older cases now, frankly, so I'd like to have it move along.

MR. DEMAIN: Should we put it over for a month?

THE COURT: We will have a further case management conference perhaps towards the end of July.

THE CLERK: The 19th.

MR. DEMAIN: I'm going to be out of town.

THE COURT: How about the following --

The 26th you're out. 1 THE CLERK: The Ninth Circuit conference. 2 THE COURT: Yes. 3 THE CLERK: August 2nd. THE COURT: How about August 2nd? 4 MR. DEMAIN: Works for me. 5 MR. KATZENBACH: I think that should be okay. 6 7 THE COURT: August 2nd. I think I probably -- you 8 know, I do sometimes these telephonically and then sometimes in I think we probably ought to do this one in person. 9 person. So 10:00. 10 MR. KATZENBACH: 10:00. 11 12 THE COURT: Yes. 13 MR. DEMAIN: Okay. 14 MR. KATZENBACH: All right. 10:00 a.m. 15 THE COURT: In the meantime, I am requiring some 16 meeting and conferring to go on. I know you may still be 17 juggling your L.A. stuff, Mr. Katzenbach, but what I don't want to have happen is for you to be here in August and have the 18 parties say, "Oh, we didn't have a chance to talk to each 19 20 other." MR. KATZENBACH: There will be time for that. 21 MR. DEMAIN: Your Honor, if I could just ask one 22 23 scheduling question just so I have this clear in my mind, in your courtroom -- I mean, I imagine there will be other Motions 24 in Limine, the sort of standard trial Motions in Limine that 25

we'll want to bring, maybe about like isolated pieces of evidence or something like that.

Do you resolve those at the pretrial? People file them before the pretrial and you resolve them at the pretrial? Or are those filed and resolved between the pretrial and trial?

THE COURT: Both. It depends. What I'll do is I go through the motions before the Pretrial Conference, and there are certain of those motions that I may even resolve prior to the Pretrial Conference, give you an order that -- if they're very clear to me. Then we'll have argument at the Pretrial Conference. And some of them I can resolve as I'm sitting on the bench and some of them I take under submission. I go back and take a look.

So the results -- the answer to your question is the rulings on pretrial motions don't come at one set time. They come on a rolling basis as I deal with them. And my standard practice is on Motions in Limine, unlike Motions for Summary Judgment or other kinds of motions, I don't, in the general course of events, have some long order. I tell you the answer.

MR. DEMAIN: Right.

THE COURT: And so in the average case, there will be one order on Motions in Limine, and that will have most of the orders. But then there are the stray ones, which are -- sometimes if they're more involved and I need more time, it takes longer. Sometimes I catch them as they come in.

So the bulk of them will be addressed and if not ruled on, 1 you will have a pretty good idea at the Pretrial Conference. 2 MR. DEMAIN: So we should file those before the 3 Pretrial Conference --4 THE COURT: Absolutely. 5 I'm not so naive to say that I don't -- I'm not inviting 6 this, but in virtually every case there will always be some 7 additional Motion in Limine that comes across the transom and I 8 understand that and I deal with it. But in a perfect world --9 the local -- my rules -- when you look the pretrial conference 10 requirements, my civil rule is -- tells you when you've got to 11 12 file your Motions in Limine. It's all set out there. Take a 13 look at my --14 MR. DEMAIN: I probably read it two years ago, but T --15 16 THE COURT: You probably did. It hasn't changed. Ιt 17 makes good reading. You can read it again. 18 Thank you very much. Okay. 19 (Proceedings adjourned at 2:58 p.m.) 20 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. DATE: Monday, July 2, 2018 Pamela A. Batalo Pamela A. Batalo, CSR No. 3593, RMR, FCRR U.S. Court Reporter